



By J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers
I. INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to analyze the meaning and importance of the “new
economy” must grapple with four questions: 
• In the long run, how important will the ongoing technological revo-
lutions in data processing and data communications turn out to be? 
• What does the crash of the Nasdaq tell us about the future of the
“new economy”? 
• How should the way the government regulates the economy
change so as to maximize the benefits we reap from these ongo-
ing technological revolutions?
• What impact will the shock to public confidence and the destruc-
tion caused by the terrorist attack of the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, have on the American economy?
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We  do not know the answers to these questions. We do, however,
have our informed speculations about what the answers might be. It is
our judgment that:
• The long-run economic impact of the ongoing technological rev-
olutions in data processing and data communications will be very
large indeed.
• The crash of the Nasdaq tells us next to nothing about the
dimensions of the economic transformation that we are undergo-
ing. It does, however, tell us that the new economy is more likely
to be a source of downward pressure on margins than of large
durable quasi-rents.
• The principal effects of the “new economy” are more likely to be
“microeconomic” than “macroeconomic,” and they will lead to pro-
found—if at present unclear—changes in how the government
should act to provide the property rights, institutional frameworks,
and “rules of the game” that underpin the market economy.
• The terrorist attack of the World Trade Center will slow private
investment in new technologies, but U.S. military spending is
likely to increase, and the increase in military spending will be
concentrated on high-technology data-processing and data-com-
munications products. On balance, therefore, the changes in eco-
nomic structure that fall under the category “new economy” are
not likely to be much affected.
Consider each of these in turn:
The first of our conclusions has to do with the long-run economic
impact of the “new economy.” Forecasting the rate of economic growth is
always hazardous, but it is more hazardous now than usual. The rate of
productivity growth in the United States was 1 percent per year in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, 2 percent per year in the mid-1990s, and 3
percent per year in the late 1990s. When faced with the sequence 1, 2,
3, what is the next number? Is it 3—the latest observation? Is it 2—the
average growth rate over the period? Is it 4—simple extrapolation? 
The correct forecast is far from obvious: The sequence of numbers
could support any of the three forecasts.
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We, however, conclude that one of the larger of the possible fore-
casts is likely to be correct. We conclude this for two reasons. First, the
pace of technological progress in the leading sectors driving the “new
economy” is very rapid indeed, and it will continue to be very rapid for
the foreseeable future. Second, the computers, switches, cables, and pro-
grams that are the products of today’s leading sectors are general-pur-
pose technologies; hence, demand for them is likely to be extremely
elastic. Rapid technological progress brings rapidly falling prices. 
Rapidly falling prices in the contest of extremely elastic demand
will produce rapidly growing expenditure shares. The economic salience
of a leading sector—its contribution to productivity growth—is the
product of the rate at which the cost of its output declines and the share
of the products it makes in total demand. Thus, unless Moore’s Law
ceases to hold or the marginal usefulness of computers and communica-
tions equipment rapidly declines, the economic salience of the data pro-
cessing and data communications sectors will not shrink but grow.
The judgment that the long-run impact of the information technol-
ogy revolution on productivity will be enormous runs somewhat
counter to the conventional wisdom, especially in the aftermath of the
crash of the Nasdaq and the terror attack on the World Trade Center.
Willingness to invest in high-tech equipment and infrastructure has
been profoundly shaken by the terror attack. One-time extreme opti-
mism about the future of the high-tech sector has been destroyed by the
crash of the Nasdaq. 
However, it is unclear what the medium-run and long-run conse-
quences of the terror attack on the World Trade Center will be. Private
demand for information-technology products is likely to drop. Military
demand for information-technology products is likely to rise. A quick
resolution of the crisis is likely to lead to a rebound in private invest-
ment as businesses that had been waiting for uncertainty to be resolved
proceed with their investment plans. A catastrophic, long, bitter, and
resource-consuming war that triggers major mobilization is likely to
lead to an acceleration of the transformation as military and civil
defense demands for information technology products jump. Technolog-
ical and structural changes speed up during wartime. Only in a middle
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scenario, in which uncertainty continues but in which military and civil
defense demand remains low, could the consequences of the terror
attack retard the economic transformation.
Moreover—and this is the second of our three conclusions—the
crash of the Nasdaq did not take place because the pace of technological
progress in the computer industry slackened, or because the rest of the
economy suddenly recognized that they were satiated with computer
equipment. The Nasdaq crashed because it became clear to previously
overoptimistic investors that the supply of bigger fools ready to buy
overvalued stocks had dried up, and that dominant market positions in
high-tech-based businesses were not sources of profits unless they came
accompanied by substantial barriers to entry—and that such barriers to
entry were turning out to be remarkably hard to create. Over a wide
range, the dominant effect of the “new economy” has been to make com-
petition more effective, not to create scale-related cost advantages.
Our third conclusion is that the principal effects of the “new econ-
omy” are more likely to be “microeconomic” than “macroeconomic.”
The new economy creates the possibility for lower average unemploy-
ment rates by making it possible for employers to meet workers’ wage
aspirations at higher levels of employment. The new economy creates
the possibility that better inventory control will diminish the inventory-
driven component of business cycles. But the past century has seen a
great deal of structural change, yet it has proven hard to link structural
changes in the economy to changes in the business cycle. 
The microeconomic effects, however, are likely to be far-reaching.
The probability is that they will have powerful effects on how markets
work and how governments must act to make the market economy
function well. Issues of the benefits from the extent of the market, of
price discrimination and the distribution of economic well-being, of
monopoly, and of the interaction of intellectual property with scientific
communication and research are all very important and very compli-
cated. These sets of issues are harder to summarize, and our conclusions
are more uncertain.
Nevertheless, several points are worth mentioning here. The first is
that the creation of knowledge is a cumulative enterprise: Isaac Newton
said that the only reason he was able to see farther than others was that
he stood on the shoulders of giants. Whenever we consider the impor-
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tance of property rights over ideas in giving companies incentives to
fund research and development, we need to also consider the impor-
tance of free information exchange and use in giving researchers the
power to do their jobs effectively. 
Second, for most of the past century price discrimination—charging
one price for one consumer and a different price for essentially the same
good for another consumer—has been seen as a way for monopolies to
further increase their monopoly profits. In the information age, the
background assumption may be different. We may come to see price
discrimination as an essential mechanism for attaining economic effi-
ciency and social welfare. The most obvious and critical example right
now is found in the pharmaceutical industry: Does anyone doubt that
good public policy today should focus on providing drug companies
with powerful incentives and tools for them to charge radically different
prices to consumers in rich and in poor countries?
Third, if the new economy is more likely to see the rapid emergence
of monopoly power in increasing-returns-to-scale, winner-take-all
industries, it also seems likely to see a swifter industry life cycle. To have
monopoly power in the making of instant-development film does a
company little good when the instant-development Polaroid camera
finds itself faced with cheaper, more versatile, and more instantaneous
digital cameras. 
Fourth, if we call the economy of the past two centuries primarily
“Smithian,” the economy of the future is likely to be primarily “Schum-
peterian.” In a “Smithian” economy, the decentralized market economy
does a magnificent job (if the initial distribution of wealth is satisfac-
tory) at producing economic welfare. Because goods are “rival”—my
sleeping in this hotel bed tonight keeps you from doing so—one per-
son’s use or consumption imposes a social cost: Because good economic
systems align the incentives facing individuals with the effects of their
actions on social welfare, it makes sense to distribute goods by charging
prices equal to marginal social cost. Because goods are “excludable”—
we have social institutions to enforce property rights, in the case of my
hotel room, the management, the police, and the federal courts—it is
easy to decentralize decision-making and control, pushing responsibility
for allocation away from the center and to the more entrepreneurial
periphery where information about the situation on the ground is likely
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to be much better (DeLong and Froomkin). The competitive paradigm
is appropriate as a framework to think about issues of microeconomic
policy and regulation.
In a “Schumpeterian” economy, the decentralized economy does a
much less good job. Goods are produced under conditions of substantial
increasing returns to scale. This means that competitive equilibrium is
not a likely outcome: The canonical situation is more likely to be one of
natural monopoly. But natural monopoly does not meet the most basic
condition for economic efficiency: that price equal marginal cost. How-
ever, forcing prices to be equal to marginal cost cannot be sustained
because the fixed set-up costs are not covered. Relying on government
subsidies to cover fixed set-up costs raises problems of its own: It
destroys the entrepreneurial energy of the market and replaces it with
the group-think and red-tape defects of administrative bureaucracy.
Moreover, in a Schumpeterian economy, it is innovation that is the prin-
cipal source of wealth—and temporary monopoly power and profits are
the reward needed to spur private enterprise to engage in such innova-
tion. The right way to think about this complex set of issues is not clear,
but it is clear that the competitive paradigm cannot be fully appropriate.
II. THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF THE ‘NEW ECONOMY’
The essence of the “new economy”
The essence of the “new economy” is quickly stated. Compare our
use of information technology today with our predecessors’ use of infor-
mation technology half a century ago. The decade of the 1950s saw
electronic computers largely replace mechanical and electromechanical
calculators and sorters as the world’s automated calculating devices. By
the end of the 1950s, there were roughly 2,000 installed computers in
the world: machines such as Remington Rand UNIVACs, IBM 702s, or
DEC PDP-1s. The processing power of these machines averaged per-
haps 10,000 machine instructions per second.
Today, talking rough orders of magnitude only, there are perhaps
300 million active computers in the world with processing power aver-
aging several hundred million instructions per second. Two thousand
computers times 10,000 instructions per second is 20 million. Three
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hundred million computers times, say, 300 million instructions/second
is 90 quadrillion—a four-billion-fold increase in the world’s raw auto-
mated computational power in 40 years, an average annual rate of
growth of 56 percent per year.
There is every reason to believe that this pace of productivity
growth in the leading sectors will continue for decades. More than a
generation ago, Intel Corporation co-founder Gordon Moore noticed
what has become Moore’s Law—that improvements in semiconductor
fabrication allow manufacturers to double the density of transistors on a
chip every 18 months. The scale of investment needed to make Moore’s
Law hold has grown exponentially along with the density of transistors
and circuits, but Moore’s Law has continued to hold, and engineers see
no immediate barriers that will bring the process of improvement to a
halt anytime soon.
This particular explosion of technology has had profound conse-
quences for how we organize production. It has consequences for the
type of goods we value. We used to live in an economy in which the
canonical source of value was an ingot of iron, a barrel of oil, or a bushel
of wheat. Such economies were based on knowledge just as much as our
economy is, but the knowledge was of how to create a useful, physically
embodied good. We are moving to an economy in which the canonical
source of value is a gene sequence, a line of computer code, or a logo. As
Chairman Greenspan has often emphasized, in such a world, goods are
increasingly valued not for their physical mass or other physical proper-
ties but for weightless ideas (Coyle). In such an economy, what you
know matters more than how much you can lift.
Leading sectors and industrial revolutions
Now, in some respects, this is a new version of an old story. Past
“new economies,” past economic “revolutions” have also seen extraordi-
nary growth in technology, the rise to dominance of new industrial sec-
tors, and the transformation. The 50 years after the invention of
electricity, 1880 to 1930, saw an increase in the mechanical horsepower
applied to U.S. industry of perhaps a hundredfold and an enormous
increase in the flexibility of factory organization—a rate of technological
progress of more than 9 percent per year (David). The hundred years
DeLong/Summers.qxd  1/28/02  11:01 AM  Page 3536 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
from 1750 to 1850, the core of the (technological) industrial revolution
itself, saw British textile output multiply thirtyfold; in the middle of the
18th century it took hand-spinning workers 500 hours to spin a pound
of cotton, but by the early 19th century it took machine-spinning work-
ers only three hours to perform the same task—a rate of technological
progress of 10 percent per year sustained across half a century (Freeman
and Louca).
These earlier transformations revolutionized their economies’ lead-
ing industries and created “new economies.” They changed the canoni-
cal sources of value and the process of production. The industrial
revolution itself triggered sustained increases in median standards of liv-
ing for the first time, a shift to a manufacturing-heavy and then to a
services-heavy economic structure, changed what people’s jobs were,
how they did them, and how they lived more completely than any pre-
vious economic shift, save the invention of agriculture and the discovery
of fire. The economic transformations of the second industrial revolution
driven by electrification and other late 19th-century general-purpose
technologies were almost as far reaching: mass production, the large
industrial enterprise, the continentwide and then worldwide market in
staple manufactured goods, the industrial labor union, the social insur-
ance state, even more rapid sustained increases in median living stan-
dards, and the middle-class society.
But consider another extraordinary wave of innovation that did not
create a “new economy.” William Nordhaus has analyzed the real price
of light—how much it costs in the way of resources and labor to pro-
duce a fixed amount of artificial illumination—and has found that the
real price of light has fallen by a thousandfold during the past two cen-
turies. A middle-class urban American household in 1800 would have
spent perhaps 4 percent of its income on illumination: candles, lamps,
oil, and matches. A middle-class urban American household today
spends less than 1 percent of its income on illumination, and consumes
more than a hundred times as much artificial illumination as did its
predecessor of two centuries ago.
Yet, we do not speak of the “illumination revolution,” or of the “new
economy” generated by the existence of exterior streetlights and interior
fluorescent office and store lights. The productivity of illumination-produc-
ing technology has increased enormously, but its impact on the economy
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and on society has been limited. Demand has not grown rapidly enough to
offset falling prices. The total share of illumination in total urban spending,
and, thus, the share of illumination production in the urban economy, has
shrunk. Our artificial illumination technologies are an enormous boon and
source of value—Nordhaus believes that it has contributed 7 percent to
the growth of real wages during the 19th and 20th centuries—but its eco-
nomic salience has been limited.
In standard growth accounting we can measure the contribution of
technological progress in one sector to economywide productivity growth
by multiplying that sector’s share in total demand by the rate at which
the costs of production (measured relative to an index of the costs of fac-
tors of production) in that sector are falling. Total productivity growth p
will be a function of the rate at which costs fall in the leading sector, pL,
the rate at which costs fall in the rest of the economy, pR, and the share s
that the products of the leading sector have in total expenditure:
p = s (pL) + (1-s)(pR) (1)
As time passes, the share s of the leading sector in total expenditure
changes. If the income elasticity of demand for the leading sector’s
products is less than one, then increases in real wealth will make s
shrink. If the relative price elasticity of demand for the leading sector’s
products is less than one, then the rapid relative fall in the prices of the
leading sector’s products produced by the fact that pL is greater than pR
will cause s to shrink as well. And as the share s of the leading sector’s
products in total expenditure shrinks, overall productivity growth p will
shrink as well, approaching the rate of growth pR in the less dynamic
rest of the economy. This is Baumol and Bowen’s “cost disease” sce-
nario: The pace of economic growth slows because demand shifts to
those goods where technological progress is weak.
However, if the income elasticity of demand for the leading sector’s
products is greater than one, increases in real wealth will make s grow.
If the relative price elasticity of demand for the leading sector’s products
is greater than one, the rapid relative fall in the price of the leading sec-
tor’s product produced by the fact that pL is greater than pR will cause
s to grow as well. As the share s of the leading sector’s products in total
expenditure grows, overall productivity growth p will rise as well. If this
DeLong/Summers.qxd  1/28/02  11:01 AM  Page 3738 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
continues and the share s of the leading sector’s products in total expen-
diture approaches one, the overall rate of productivity growth will rise
to approach the rate of growth pL in the dynamic leading sector. 
Such an acceleration of productivity growth is, in fact, what hap-
pened in the 1980s and 1990s, until the cyclical slowdown of the past
year. A year ago in this room, Chairman Greenspan said that it was
“difficult to find credible evidence in the United States that the rate of
structural productivity growth has stopped increasing ... after stripping
out the significant impact on productivity acceleration of the recent
shape of the business cycle, the second derivative of output per hour still
appears to be positive.” We are not yet able to separate the trend from
the cycle component of productivity during the current slowdown. It is
certainly possible—if not probable—that when U.S. growth resumes,
trend productivity will grow as fast or faster than it did in the late
1990s. The elasticity of demand for high-tech products, and the share of
income attributable to the information-technology capital stock are
likely to keep rising. It is a property of exponential growth that equal
proportional increments translate into larger arithmetic increments over
time, and, thus, that even a slower proportional rate of growth within
the high-tech sector itself is likely to translate into a larger contribution
to the growth of the economy as a whole.
This is, in fact, what happened in the original industrial revolution:
As the dynamic modern sector grew to encompass the bulk of the econ-
omy, overall productivity growth accelerated (Crafts). The heroic age of
double-digit annual productivity increase within the steam-power and
textile-spinning sectors of the economy ended before the 19th century
was a quarter over. Yet, the major contribution of steam power and tex-
tile machinery to British aggregate economic growth took place in the
middle half of the 19th century. Thus, historians of the British industrial
revolution, like Landes, focus on the late 18th century, while macroecon-
omists and sociologists focus on the mid-19th century: The lag in time
between the major innovations and fastest proportional growth of the
leading sector on the one hand, and its major influence on aggregates
on the other, are likely to be substantial.
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Elasticities of substitution and general-purpose technologies
What determines the income and price elasticity of demand for high-
tech products? The more high-tech products are seen as “luxury” goods,
and the greater is the number of different uses found for high-tech prod-
ucts as their prices decline, the larger will be the income and price elastic-
ities of demand—and, thus, the stronger will be the forces pushing the
expenditure share up, not down, as technological advance continues.
All of the history of the electronics sector suggests that these elas-
ticities are high, not low. Each successive generation of falling prices
appears to produce new uses for computers and communications equip-
ment at an astonishing rate. 
The first, very expensive, computers were seen as good at perform-
ing complicated and lengthy sets of arithmetic operations. The first
leading-edge applications of large-scale electronic computing power
were military: The burst of innovation during World War II that pro-
duced the first one-of-a-kind hand-tooled electronic computers was
totally funded by the war effort. The coming of the Korean War won
IBM its first contract to actually deliver a computer: the million-dollar
defense calculator. The military demand in the 1950s and the 1960s by
projects such as Whirlwind and SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Envi-
ronment)—a strategic air defense system—both filled the assembly
lines of computer manufacturers and trained the generation of engineers
that designed and built.
The first leading-edge civilian economic applications of large—for
the time, the 1950s—amounts of computer power came from govern-
ment agencies such as the Census Bureau and from industries such as
insurance and finance, which performed lengthy sets of calculations as
they processed large amounts of paper. The first UNIVAC computer
was bought by the Census Bureau. The second and third orders came
from A.C. Nielson Market Research and the Prudential Insurance Com-
pany. This second, slightly cheaper, generation of computers was used
not to make sophisticated calculations, but to make the extremely sim-
ple calculations needed by the Census Bureau, and by the human
resource departments of large corporations. The Census Bureau used
computers to replace its electro-mechanical tabulating machines. Busi-
DeLong/Summers.qxd  1/28/02  11:01 AM  Page 3940 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
nesses used computers to do the payroll, report-generating, and record-
analyzing tasks that their own electro-mechanical calculators had previ-
ously performed.
The still next generation of computers—exemplified by the IBM
360 series—were used to stuff data into and pull data out of databases
in real time—airline reservations processing systems, insurance systems,
inventory control. It became clear that the computer was good for
much more than performing repetitive calculations at high speed. The
computer was much more than a calculator, however large and however
fast. It was also an organizer. American Airlines used computers to cre-
ate its SABRE automated reservations system, which cost as much as
ten airplanes (Cohen, Delong, and Zysman). The insurance industry
automated its back-office sorting and classifying. 
Subsequent uses have included computer-aided product design,
applied to everything from airplanes designed without wind tunnels, to
pharmaceuticals designed at the molecular level for particular applica-
tions. In this area and in other applications, the major function of the
computer is not as a calculator, a tabulator, or a database manager, but is
instead as a “what-if” machine. The computer creates models of “what-
if” would happen if the airplane, the molecule, the business, or the doc-
ument were to be built up in a particular way. It, thus, enables an
amount and a degree of experimentation in the virtual world that would
be prohibitively expensive in resources and time in the real world. 
The value of this use as a “what-if” machine took most computer
scientists and computer manufacturers by surprise. None of the engi-
neers designing software for the IBM 360 series, none of the parents of
Berkeley UNIX, nobody before Dan Bricklin programmed Visicalc had
any idea of the utility of a spreadsheet program. Yet, the invention of
the spreadsheet marked the spread of computers into the office as a
“what-if” machine. Indeed, the computerization of Americas white-col-
lar offices in the 1980s was largely driven by the spreadsheet program’s
utility—first Visicalc, then Lotus 1-2-3, and finally Microsoft Excel.
For one example of the importance of a computer as a “what-if”
machine, consider that today’s complex designs for new semiconductors
would be simply impossible without automated design tools. The
process has come full circle. Progress in computing depends upon
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Moore’s Law; and the progress in semiconductors that makes possible
the continued march of Moore’s Law depends upon progress in comput-
ers and software.
As increasing computer power has enabled their use in real-time
control, the domain has expanded further as lead users have figured out
new applications. Production and distribution processes have been and
are being transformed. Moreover, it is not just robotic auto painting or
assembly that have become possible, but scanner-based retail, quick-
turn supply chains, and robot-guided hip surgery as well.
In the most recent years, the evolution of the computer and its uses
has continued. It has branched along two quite different paths. First,
computers have burrowed inside conventional products as they have
become embedded systems. Second, computers have connected outside to
create what we call the World Wide Web: a distributed global database of
information all accessible through the single global network. Paralleling
the revolution in data processing capacity has been a similar revolution in
data communications capacity. There is no sign that the domain of poten-
tial uses has been exhausted (Cohen, DeLong, and Zysman).
Moreover, aggregate data show that the economic salience of the
high-tech sector has been rising over time. Federal Reserve Board staff
economists Steven Oliner and Daniel Sichel have calculated that in the
1980s, information technology capital—computer hardware, software,
and communications equipment—accounted for 3.3 percent of the
income earned in the economy, and contributed 0.5 percent per year to
economic growth. By the late 1990s, according to Oliner and Sichel,
information technology capital accounted for 7.0 percent of income
earned in the economy and contributed 1.4 percent per year to eco-
nomic growth. 
Another way to put it is that modern semiconductor-based elec-
tronics technologies fit Bresnahan and Trajtenberg’s definition of a
“general-purpose technology”—one useful not just for one narrow class
but for an extremely wide variety of production processes, one for which
each decline in price appears to bring forth new uses, one that can spark
off a long-lasting major economic transformation. So far, there are no
good reasons to believe that the economic salience of high-tech indus-
tries is about to decline, or that the pace at which innovation continues
is about to flag. And there are good reasons to believe that the eco-
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nomic salience of high-tech industries will increase. Because of the gen-
eral-purpose nature of the technology, it has an enormous number of
potential uses, many of which have surely not yet been developed.
There is room for computerization to grow on the intensive margin, as
computer use saturates potential markets such office work and e-mail.
But there is also room to grow on the extensive margin, as microproces-
sors are used for tasks such as controlling hotel room doors or changing
the burn mix of a household furnace that few, two decades ago, would
have thought of.
III. THE NASDAQ CRASH AND THE ‘NEW ECONOMY’
If the future of the “new economy” is as bright as the previous sec-
tion suggests, then why have high-tech stock market values fallen so far
in the past year and a half? There is a strand of today’s conventional
wisdom that holds that the crash of the Nasdaq reveals that the “new
economy” was smoke and mirrors. It was the irrational exuberance that
often breaks out at the peak of a boom, not any deeper or permanent
change in the economy. But it is more likely that the crash of the Nas-
daq was the result of the realization by investors that the “new econ-
omy” was, in most sectors and for most firms, likely to lead not to large
quasi-rents from established market positions but to heightened compe-
tition and reduced margins. 
The exuberance that pushed the Nasdaq so high in 1999 and early
2000 rested on the belief that technological leap forward in data pro-
cessing and data communications technologies had created a large host
of winner-take-all markets in which increasing returns to scale were the
dominant feature. An information good—a computer program, a piece
of online entertainment, or a source of information—the work only
needs to be done once and then it can be distributed to a potentially
unlimited number of consumers for pennies: Producing at twice the
scale gains you nearly a 50 percent cost advantage. Moreover, informa-
tion goods produced at larger scale are more valuable to consumers. The
version with the largest market share becomes the standard. It is the
easiest to figure out how to use, the easiest to find support for, and the
one that works best with other products (which are, of course, designed
to work best with it).
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In that part of the new economy dominated by supply-side
economies of scale and demand-side economies of scope, a firm that
establishes a market-share lead gains a nearly overwhelming position.
Its products are most valuable to customers. Its cost of production is the
least. Unless its competitors are willing to take extraordinary and
extraordinarily costly steps—like those Microsoft took against
Netscape, pouring a fortune into creating a competitive product and
then distributing the competing Internet Explorer for free—the first
firm to establish a dominant market position will reap high profits as
long as its sector of the industry lasts. 
But increasing returns to scale and winner-take-all markets are not
the only or even the primary consequence of high-tech’s technological
revolution. It is at least as likely that innovations in computer and com-
munications technologies are competition’s friends. They are the fric-
tions that, in the past, gave nearly every producer in the economy a
little bit of monopoly power. They enable swift searches that reveal the
prices and qualities of every single producer, while, in the past, such
information could only be acquired by a lengthy, costly, painful process.
In the past, you could comparison-shop only by trudging from store to
store. In the present, you can use the World Wide Web.
Thus, in the “new economy,” more markets will be contestable.
Competitive edges based on past reputations, or brand loyalty, or adver-
tising footprints will fade away. As they do so, profit margins will fall:
Competition will become swifter, stronger, more pervasive, and more
nearly perfect. 
Consumers will gain and shareholders will lose. Those products that
can be competitively supplied will be at very low margins. The future of
the technology is bright; the future of the profit margins of busi-
nesses—save for those few that truly are able to use economies of scale
to create mammoth cost advantages—is dim. Is it really possible for
anyone to acquire significant economies of scale by writing a single suite
of software that will cover the heterogeneous purchasing requirements
of millions of businesses seeking to streamline their operations by using
the Internet? Is it really possible for anyone to acquire significant
economies of scale by using the Internet to distribute information about
groceries? The Nasdaq crash was the result of the marginal investor’s
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realizing that the odds were heavily against. But the Nasdaq crash tells
us little about the future of the underlying technologies or about their
true value.
Perhaps the best analogy is an old topic that was a puzzle to the
classical economists of three centuries ago: the difference in price
between water and diamonds. Water is absolutely essential to sustain
life, and, thus, immensely valuable to every consumer. Yet, (at least in
wet northern Europe and the eastern United States) water is very cheap
indeed. By contrast, diamonds have been and remain very expensive.
The gap in price between water and diamonds does not tell us that dia-
monds are useful and valuable and water is not, but that it has, so far,
proved much easier to maintain market power and high margins in the
diamond business than in the water business.
The analogy to the Internet, the “new economy,” and the crash of
the Nasdaq is straightforward. Even Internet Explorer, which today has
as dominant a position in the browser market as anyone could wish, is
not (or is not yet) a source of profits: Barring the creation of some essen-
tial function that Explorer can serve that competing browsers cannot,
our modern computer and communications technologies simply make it
too cheap and too easy to distribute a competing product.
IV. THE MACROECONOMY AND THE ‘NEW ECONOMY’
What are the macroeconomic consequences of the “new economy”?
One, at least, is clear: In the past half decade, we have seen the impact
of the information technology revolution in the recent acceleration in
American productivity growth. The others remain more speculative.
As Martin Baily will discuss later, one possible macroeconomic con-
sequence of the acceleration in productivity growth is the improved
labor market and reduced NAIRU that we are seeing today. The high-
pressure economy, tight labor market, and gratifyingly low unemploy-
ment rate of the past half decade are hard to envision without the
productivity speedup, which is largely driven by the technological revo-
lutions in data processing and data communications. A second possible
macroeconomic consequence of the computerization of American busi-
ness is a decline in the inventory fluctuation-driven component of the
business cycle. The decline in aggregate inventory-to-shipments ratios
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in manufacturing during the past two decades has been substantial.
And, as Michael Woodford will discuss later, the changes in the macro-
economy brought about bring changes in the way that monetary policy
should be conducted as well. All of these have the potential to be sub-
stantial boons.
Nevertheless, in our view at least, the macroeconomic changes may
not be as pronounced as we hope. The past 150 years have seen the
world’s advanced industrial economies shift from primarily agricultural
to primarily industrial and now primarily service economies. They have
seen repeated technological revolutions, as one leading sector after
another—chemicals, electricity, autos, aircraft—has taken the lead in
productivity acceleration. They have seen the rise of sophisticated sys-
tems of consumer credit that allow households to smooth their spending
over time. They have seen the rise of the modern social insurance state
to serve as a sea anchor for the economy by virtue of the large relative
size of its spending programs. They have seen the rise of systems of
deposit insurance to reduce the probability of a massive chain of bank-
ruptcies and, thus, a full-fledged financial panic. They have seen the
government take on responsibility for managing the macroeconomy. 
Yet, in spite of all these structural changes, the business cycle in the
second half of the 20th century has looked remarkably like the business
cycle in the last quarter of the 19th century. It is remarkably difficult to
trace causal links from structural changes in the economy to changes in
the business cycle and in macroeconomic policy (Romer). Indeed,
Romer traces the major changes in the business cycle over the past 100
years not to any of the major structural changes in the economy, but to
changes in how the Federal Reserve has thought about issues of macro-
economic management.
Moreover, there is one dimension along which the “new economy”
is a source of macroeconomic danger. With the possible exception of the
1990s, the decade in the past century that saw the fastest productivity
growth and the greatest degree of structural change was the 1920s.
And the booming 1920s were followed by the disastrous 1930s. 
There was no necessary reason that a decade as good as the 1920s
had to be followed by a Great Depression. As John Maynard Keynes
put it at the start of the Depression, while “some part of the investment
which was going on [in the 1920s] in the world at large was doubtless
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ill judged and unfruitful,” there could be no doubt that “the world was
enormously enriched by the constructions of the quinquennium from
1925 to 1929; its wealth increased in these five years by as much as in
any other ten or twenty years of its history. ... I see little sign of any seri-
ous want of balance such as is alleged by some authorities. ... A few
more quinquennia of equal activity might, indeed, have brought us near
to the economic Eldorado where all our reasonable economic needs
would be satisfied.” And it was “an extraordinary imbecility that this
wonderful outburst of productive energy should be the prelude to
impoverishment and depression.” In Keynes’s view, the source of the
Great Depression was “not in the high level of investment which was
proceeding up to the spring of 1929, but in the subsequent cessation of
this investment.”
But Keynes was both right and wrong. The end of a period of high
euphoria and extravagant boom will inevitably bring a reduction in
investment in the economy’s leading sectors. This reduction will not, by
itself, bring about a Great Depression—or even more than a period of
“readjustment”—as long as other sources of demand are present and
able to absorb the slack in productive resources created by the end of
high euphoria. However, managing this expenditure switching is a very
delicate macroeconomic task. 
Moreover, a euphoric boom is a period during which people stop
thinking as intensely about problems of macroeconomic management
and the business cycle. Ironically, it is precisely during euphoria that
countercyclical policy becomes less important. But it is in the aftermath
of euphoria that countercyclical policy becomes more important than at
any other time. For example, nobody in Japan in the late 1980s paid
any attention to problems of business cycle management. Few in Japan
in the early 1990s paid sufficient attention to the business cycle. And
the Japanese economy and the world economy today are suffering from
that lapse.
Thus, the largest short-run impact of the “new economy” may be
that it increases the stakes at risk in macroeconomic management.
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V. THE MICROECONOMY AND THE ‘NEW ECONOMY’
It is more likely that the principal consequences of the “new econ-
omy” will be found in the microeconomy, and that they will be accom-
panied by important changes in the underpinnings—property rights,
institutions, “rules of the game”—that governments must provide if
market economies are to function well.
It is a principal characteristic of the “new economy” that my con-
sumption of a good does not necessarily detract from your consumption
of it. If I am wearing my shoe, you cannot be wearing my shoe. But if I
am informed, if I have access to software, you can also be informed, you
can also have access to that software. Thomas Jefferson put it best: “He
who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without less-
ening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me.” A world in which the information-technology sector is
salient is one in which more of the goods that are produced will have
the character of pharmaceuticals or books or records, in that they
involve very large fixed costs and much smaller marginal costs. It is one
in which positive network effects will be much more pervasive. A single
lonely fax machine is a hunk of metal that is best used as a doorstop.
Yet, 100,000 fax machines make possible 10 billion different one-way
connections. This is Metcalfe’s Law: The number of connections that are
possible, and, thus, the utility of the network, rises not proportionately
with the number of nodes that are connected but by more—as much as
the square of that number.
The greater salience of these characteristics has crucial implications
for business and for the functioning of the economy as a whole. The new
economy will have more examples of very high fixed costs and very low
marginal costs. Such a pattern can produce positive feedback: Rising
demand will often produce higher efficiency and higher returns, drives,
and lower prices, leading to yet higher demand. The old economy is
driven by negative feedback: Rising demand leads to higher prices,
which leads producers, when prices rise, to produce more and con-
sumers to buy less, which restores and equilibrium at a lower level of
demand. By contrast, in an information economy, in that sense, if the
agricultural and industrial economies were “Smithian,” the new econ-
omy is “Schumpeterian.”
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There is a wide range of potential implications. In finance, as
Andrei Shleifer will discuss, our ongoing technological revolutions are
drastically lowering transactions costs and increasing the flow of infor-
mation, while, at the same time, they may be overwhelming the filters
that used to separate the news from the noise. The quantity of “infor-
mation” rises, while the quality of information may fall. As Hal Varian
will discuss, the “new economy” raises the salience of and the stakes at
risk in issues of market structure and market regulation that must all
now be rethought.
The extent of the market
High initial fixed costs and low, even zero, marginal costs pose dif-
ficult questions but also open up enormous opportunities for economic
policy. In a “new economy,” the canonical industrial structure will be
more like what we have seen in pharmaceuticals, publishing, or the
recording industry than in the corn-production or textile or steel indus-
try. The opportunity is that growth should have a greater potential to
snowball. Success may have greater potential to become self-perpetuat-
ing, as growth leads to rapid declines in prices, and so to further expan-
sion in the market and further growth. We see aspects of this today:
Orphan drugs cost much more than drugs with a larger market, and
bestselling books cost much less than academic monographs that very
few people may read.
This reality points up the importance of making sure that we func-
tion with as large markets as possible. When a market is driven by a
positive feedback, its efficiency will be directly related to its size. Larger
networks and larger production lines over which to amortize high initial
fixed costs will generate cascading benefits. Thus, government policies
that expand the size of markets in any way—through reducing trade
barriers, through improved infrastructure, through the removal of other
barriers to market access—become that much more important and that
much more worthwhile. Ever since David Ricardo, economists have
focused on comparative advantage as the most important reason that
trade should be free. But it may well be that we are moving into a
future in which these benefits are less important than those of increas-
ing returns to scale and the extent of the market.
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If so, this means that openness to the international economy will
become an increasingly critical requirement for economic growth in the
future, especially for relatively small economies. 
Monopoly
An industry with high fixed costs and near-zero variable costs has
another important characteristic: it tends to monopoly. The rule of
thumb in high technology has been that the market leader makes a for-
tune, the first runner-up breaks even, and everyone else goes bankrupt
rapidly. In such an industrial structure, the only sustainable form of
competition becomes competition for the leading position in the next
generation market that is growing up now—for competition in already
established markets with high fixed and low variable costs is nearly
impossible to sustain.
Good public policy in such an environment should make sure that
the monopoly profits from the provision of things that become essential
services are not too large (although they need to be large to reward all
the past investments, successful and failed, in the market). Good public
policy in such an environment needs to make sure that producers with a
near-monopoly position in one generation’s market do not use that
position to retard innovation and the growth of the next-generation
market, or to guarantee themselves a large head start in the race to
establish a leading position in the next-generation market. But good
public policy also needs to make sure not to take steps that artificially
limit the market shares of the most efficient producers of this genera-
tion’s products, for large market shares go with low costs and (rela-
tively) low prices charged to consumers.
It is far from clear how such policies can be designed, or how close pol-
icy can get to its ideal, given the blunt instrument that is our legal system.
Distribution
Technology does provide Americans with remarkable opportunities,
but they are not there for those who lack the knowledge and skills to
take advantage of them. It has been estimated that in America today, a
child born of a single teenage mother who did not finish high school has
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an 80 percent chance of living in poverty at the age of ten. Male life
expectancy in Washington, D.C., is several years below that in Mongo-
lia or Belarus.
In the new economy, it is clear that human capital is a strong com-
plement to physical capital and intellectual capital. The return on invest-
ment in human capital has been rising so that it is now quite possibly the
highest that it has ever been (Goldin and Katz). It is, thus, doubly
important to ensure that children receive the best education possible. If
investments in factories were the most important investments in the
industrial age, the most important investments in an information age are
surely investments in the human brain. Investments in human capital
also have the potential to bring the promise of equality of opportunity
closer to reality. The middle-class society of mid-20th century America
was, in large part, created and sustained by America’s early 20th century
commitment to mass high school education. Policies to generate a simi-
lar commitment to mass higher education for the information age have
the promise of producing not just a richer society but one of more widely
distributed opportunity as well.
Moreover, the demand-side consequences of the “new economy” for
distribution promise to be as important as the supply-side consequences
for the value of education. For most of the past century, price discrimi-
nation—charging one price to one set of consumers and a very different
price for a nearly identical product to another set of consumers—has
been viewed by most as an unmixed evil. It has been seen as a way that
those with monopoly power can further increase their monopoly profits.
But price discrimination has another face as well: It is a way that busi-
nesses can extend their market and make their product of more value to
consumers. An information good-providing firm that successfully
engages in price discrimination can still make a profit by charging high
prices to its relatively well-off core market, and can add to that profit
and greatly increase the social utility of its product by charging low
prices to those who are relatively poor. It may well be that in the infor-
mation age, our attitude toward price discrimination should shift. 
There are many cases—of which the provision of pharmaceuticals to
people living in poor countries is only the most critical and obvious—in
which good public policy should focus on making it easier for companies
to charge wildly different prices to different groups of consumers. The
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reason that pharmaceutical companies charge high rather than low prices
to customers in poor countries is relatively small: Their major fear is that
of the reimportation of low-priced drugs into the rich first world. The
loss in profits they suffer from charging an inappropriately high price to
customers in poor countries is small change relative to the gray-market
reimportation risks that they believe they face. Yet, the cost in lost lives
in poor countries is unacceptably high. Effective ways of segmenting the
market more completely, so that rich country customers could pay the
fixed costs while poor country customers paid close to marginal cost, has
the potential to create an enormous addition to world welfare.
Innovation and intellectual property
The most critical issues, however, are those that revolve around
intellectual property. It is a fact that we today simply do not know yet
how to make the intellectual property system work for the new econ-
omy. Back in the Gilded Age, intellectual property as such was not such
an important factor. Industrial success was based on knowledge, but on
knowledge crystalized in dedicated capital. Many people knew organic
chemistry. Few companies—those that had made massive invest-
ments—could make organic chemicals.
Today, it appears that intellectual property is rapidly becoming a
much more important source of value. One response would be to rein-
force the rights of “owners.” The underlying idea is that markets work
because everything is someone’s property. Property rights give produc-
ers the right incentives to make, and users the right incentives to calcu-
late, the social cost of what they use. It is clear that without strong
forms of protection of property rights, a great many useful products
would never be developed at all. This principle applies as strongly to
intellectual as to other forms of property.
But with information goods, the social marginal cost of distribution
is close to zero. One of the most fundamental principles of economics is
that prices should be equal to social marginal cost. In this case, strong
intellectual property rights have the potential to decrease economic effi-
ciency by driving prices away from marginal social costs.
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Thus, different economic principles cut in different directions. If
information goods are to be distributed at their marginal cost of pro-
duction—zero—they cannot be created and produced by entrepreneur-
ial firms that use revenues obtained from sales to consumers to cover
their costs. If information goods are to be created and produced by
businesses that face the right incentives to explore new paths, they must
be able to anticipate selling their products at a profit to someone. If the
government is to subsidize the creation of information goods, the gov-
ernment needs mechanisms to determine in which directions the subsi-
dies should flow, and government bureaucracies have never been able to
choose and assess the directions of applied research and development
very well. Mainstream academic economics has long underestimated the
importance of Hayekian insights into market competition as a discovery
mechanism, of the entrepreneurial advantages of private enterprise, and
of the administrative defects of overly rigid systems of top-down control
that come with centralized funding (Scott). 
We  know that markets and the spur of competition are the best
producers of applied knowledge. But we do not know how to use mar-
kets and competition for this purpose, as far as information goods are
concerned, and still satisfy the economic principle that final consumers
should pay no more than marginal cost.
At the same time, we also know that the Lockeian belief that prop-
erty rights are good, that intellectual property is a form of property like
any other, and, thus, that stronger intellectual property rights are very
good is simply wrong. In the “Smithian” economy, property rights are
good because they (a) force buyers to pay prices for goods, and, thus, to
approximately internalize in their own decision-making the effect of
their actions in reducing the ability of others to use scarce, rival goods,
and (b) allow for the decentralization of economic decisions and, thus,
for entrepreneurship. In the “new economy,” with non-rival goods,
property rights that force buyers to pay prices above very low marginal
cost do not contribute to but detract from economic efficiency and lead
not to decentralization but to a greater degree of centralization in eco-
nomic decision-making in the hands of the owner of the intellectual
property rights. 
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Complicating the issues still further, the most important innova-
tions that we see today are built on progress in basic science—every-
thing from group theory to quantum theory. If one asked what research
had made the most important contribution to the navigation of ships
since the 1600s, a good case could be made that it was pure mathemat-
ics. Pure mathematics built the tools used by James Clerk Maxwell to
construct his equations describing the behavior of electromagnetic
fields. Without Maxwell’s equations, we would not have radios. We
know from long experience that basic science is best diffused broadly, so
production must be supported from the outside. That is why a crucial
component of public policy at this time must be strong support for
basic research. 
Moreover, basic research must be widely disseminated because basic
research and applied research are cumulative enterprises. There is a
good chance that heavy restrictions on the dissemination of intellectual
property will do less to create incentives for research and development
and more to destroy the web of scientific and technical communication
that make research and development effective (Gallini and Scotchmer).
Isaac Newton said that the only reason he was able to see farther than
others was that he stood on the shoulders of giants. Whenever we con-
sider the importance of property rights over ideas in giving companies
incentives to fund research and development, we need to also consider
the importance of free information exchange and use in giving
researchers the power to do their jobs effectively. Traditional discussions
within economics have focused on the length of patents. Yet, it may
well be that the depth and breadth of patents are at least as important
determinants of economic progress.
New institutions and new kinds of institutions—perhaps even some
that have been tried before, like the French government’s purchase and
placing in the public domain of the first photographic patents in the
early 19th century (Kremer 1998)—may well be necessary to achieve
the fourfold objectives of (a) price equal to marginal cost, (b) entrepre-
neurial energy, (c) accelerating the cumulative process of research, and
(d) providing appropriate financial incentives for research and develop-
ment. The work of Harvard economist Michael Kremer (1998, 2000),
both with respect to the possibility of public purchase of patents at auc-
tion and of shifting some public research and development funding
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from effort-oriented to result-oriented processes (that is, holding con-
tests for private companies to develop vaccines instead of funding
research directly), is especially intriguing in its attempts to develop
institutions that have all the advantages of market competition, natural
monopoly, and public provision.
It will be no surprise to you that at least one of the authors has been
thinking very hard about the role that heavily endowed non-profit edu-
cational institutions have to play in attempting to resolve the dilemmas
of innovation and intellectual property in the “new economy.”
VI. CONCLUSION
The balance of probabilities is that our modern data processing and
data communications technologies are, indeed, creating a “new econ-
omy.” It is likely that they are producing profound change with contin-
uing powerful impact. These are seismic innovations, ranking with
electric power. Even if they are not likely to have profound impact in
reducing cyclical volatility, they will have profound microeconomic
effects that we do not yet fully understand. We already know that the
competitive paradigm is unlikely to be fully appropriate, but we do not
yet know what the right replacement paradigm will be. We know that
property rights become a central question. We know that some market
practices—such as price discrimination—that have traditionally been
looked at with some skepticism should perhaps be re-evaluated.
It cannot be an accident that Soviet-style communism, planning
ministries throughout the developing world, and large corporations run
by command and control all ran into a brick wall in the same decade
and had to be restructured. Increasingly, the balance of economic
advantage has tilted in favor of systems in which economic power and
opportunities are more decentralized—and the skills and ideas of the
individual are given greater weight. At the level of individual businesses
and national economies, flexibility is winning out over rigid controls.
And the capacity to respond to change is winning out over the capacity
to dictate it. Whether the NBER looks back three years from now and
concludes that the U.S. economy went through a small recession in the
past year or so or not, the structural changes that we call the “new econ-
omy” are ongoing.
DeLong/Summers.qxd  1/28/02  11:01 AM  Page 54ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2001 55
Moreover, as the economy’s structure changes, desirable govern-
ment policies change as well. If we step back a bit, we can see that the
governmental foundations underpinning the market system necessary
to make it function well are not fixed in stone. As technology and soci-
ety have changed in the past, what the government needed to do in
order to make the market function changed too.
Consider, for example, the British agricultural revolution of the 150
years before 1800. It was, in the judgment of many historians, an essen-
tial prerequisite for the industrial revolution itself. In the absence of the
British agricultural revolution, Britain in 1800 would have been dirt-poor
and British labor dirt-cheap, as very low labor productivity in agriculture
would have diminished urban wages as well. With low wages, where
would the middle-class demand to buy the low-end textiles, ironware,
and railway tickets that were the products of the British industrial revolu-
tion have come from? With low wages, how much innovative activity
would have been directed toward building cranky and temperamental
machines when workers desperate for anything and willing to do any task
by hand were abundant? Both supply-side and demand-side arguments
that the British agricultural revolution was an essential prerequisite for
the British industrial revolution have always seemed very plausible.
But the British agricultural revolution would not have taken place
without the enclosure movement: the extinguishing of traditional
manorial common rights to the use of land, the replacement of the
open-field system of arranging cropland in long, narrow, unfenced strips
by enclosed-fenced fields. The distributional consequences of enclosures
were horrible. The efficiency benefits appear to have been large. The
enclosure movement provided improving landlords and farmers with
the incentive to experiment with new, potentially more productive tech-
niques. And the enclosure movement created the organizational form
needed to make such experimentation possible: Unanimous consent of
the 30 heads of household in a village to experiment with patterns of
agricultural practice different than those time-honored by custom was
not going to happen, and under the open-field system unanimous con-
sent was needed. The old, pre-modern institutional arrangements and
forms of British agriculture were, in the judgment of many historians at
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least, incompatible with the agricultural revolution. Had institutions
and laws not changed, that particular economic transformation would
have been badly hobbled.
It was obvious from early in the 19th century that the British indus-
trial revolution was an extraordinary economic transformation that
would transform politics and society, as well as production and distribu-
tion. Throughout the second quarter of the 19th century, politicians,
journalists, novelists, technologists, and revolutionaries made pilgrim-
ages to Manchester, England, to examine the extraordinary productive
power of steam-applied-to-textile production, and to meditate on the
“new economy” then being created.
Few in Manchester, however, even noticed that the British govern-
ment was not building schools for children of workers migrating in
from the countryside to the jobs in the new factories. Yet, lack of an
educated workforce meant that the post-steam-engine technologies of
electricity, metallurgy, and chemistry found themselves much more at
home in late 19th century Germany—where investments in schools had
been made—than in late 19th century Britain. The failure of Britain to
evolve the institutions—to provide the education, training, public
health, and infrastructure needed to support not current but evolving
and future technologies—meant that its mid-19th century industrial
leadership could not be sustained. And so, Britain entered the 20th cen-
tury and its half-century death struggle with anti-democratic German
regimes, having already squandered a very large initial edge in technol-
ogy and productivity.
Or consider the U.S. Gilded Age toward the end of the 19th century.
The Gilded Age saw the coming of mass production, the large corpora-
tion, the continentwide market, and electric power to the United States.
You needed more than the improvements in production technology that
made possible the large-scale factory in order to arrive at the large indus-
trial organization and the high-productivity, mass-production economy.
From our viewpoint today, we can look back and say that in the United
States, this economic transformation rested on five things:
• Limited liability.
• The stock market.
• Investment banking.
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• The continentwide market.
• The existence of an antitrust policy.
Legal and institutional changes—limited liability, the stock market,
and an investment banking industry—were needed to assemble the
capital to build factories on the scale needed to serve a continental mar-
ket. Without limited liability, individual investors would have been
unwilling to risk potentially unlimited losses from the actions of man-
agers they did not know and could not control. Without the stock and
bond markets, investors would have been less willing to invest in large
corporations because of the resulting loss of liquidity. Without invest-
ment banking, investors’ problem of sorting worthwhile enterprises
from others would have been much more difficult.
Moreover, political changes—the rise of antitrust—were needed for
two reasons. The first was to try to make sure that the enormous
economies of scale within the grasp of the large corporation were not
achieved at the price of replacing competition by monopoly. The second
was the political function of reassuring voters that the growing large cor-
porations would be the economy’s servants rather than the voters’ masters. 
Last, institutional changes were needed to make sure that the new
corporations could serve a continental market. For example, think of
Swift Meatpacking, subject of an ongoing dissertation at Berkeley by
Gary Fields. Swift’s business was based on a very good idea: mass-
slaughter the beef in Chicago, ship it dressed to Boston, and undercut
local small-scale Boston-area slaughterhouses by a third at the butcher-
shop. This was a very good business plan. It promised to produce large
profits for entrepreneurs and investors and a much better diet at lower
cost for consumers. But what if the Massachusetts legislature were to
require, for reasons of health and safety, that all meat sold in Massachu-
setts be inspected live and on the hoof by a Massachusetts meat inspec-
tor in Massachusetts immediately before slaughter?
Without the right system of governance—in this case U.S. federal
pre-emption of state health and safety regulation affecting interstate
commerce—you wouldn’t have had America’s Chicago meatpacking
industry (or Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle). That piece of late 19th century
industrialization wouldn’t have fallen into place.
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The Gilded Age industrialization of the United States gave the
country some impressive displays of crony capitalism, some “malefactors
of great wealth” in President Theodore Roosevelt’s phrase. It gave us
the core endowment of at least one major West Coast university, derived
from ex-governor of California Leland’s sweetheart deal between the
Central Pacific Railroad he promoted and the construction company he
and his partners owned outright. It also gave the average American the
highest standard of living and the most productive industry in the
world in the first half of the 20th century.
By contrast, in Europe there was no continental market because of
national tariffs. Without the continent-spanning market, fewer of the
possible economies of scale could be attained. In Britain, with next to no
pre-World War I development of investment banking, you didn’t get
assembly of the pools of capital to build the large factories in the first
place. British businesses stayed smaller and much less efficient than their
American counterparts (Chandler). In Germany, with no antitrust policy
worthy of the name, there was no brake on the cartelization of modern
industry. Political theories that German industrial cartels poisoned Ger-
many’s politics in the first half of the 20th century are now out of favor,
but surely cartel-driven output restriction made the average German
household poorer and Germany’s distribution of wealth more skewed.
Because American institutions changed to support, nurture, and
manage the coming of mass production and the large-scale business
enterprise chronicled by Alfred Chandler—and because European insti-
tutions, by and large, did not—it was America that was on the cutting
edge of the future at the start of the 20th century. It was America that
was “the furnace where the future was being forged,” as Leon Trotsky
once said.
What changes in the government-constructed underpinnings of the
market economy are needed for it to flourish as the economic changes
produced by computers take hold? How should governments deal with
their possibly large distributional implications? And what failures to
change or what changes made in support of vested interests would hob-
ble the transformation now under way?
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